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Abstract 
 
The surge in popularity of social media, cloud computing, and mobile services has created an 
unprecedented opportunity for the collection, use and sale of personal consumer information. While these 
services provide many benefits, individuals suffer when this information is lost, stolen, or improperly 
accessed, causing them to seek legal redress. However, very little is known about the drivers, mechanics, 
and outcomes of these lawsuits, making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of litigation at balancing 
organizations’ usage of personal data with individual privacy rights. Using a unique database of manually 
collected lawsuits, we analyze court dockets for over 230 federal data breach lawsuits from 2000 to 2010. 
We investigate two research questions: Which data breaches are being litigated? Which data breach 
lawsuits are settling? By providing the first comprehensive empirical analysis of data breach litigation, our 
findings offer insights in the debate over privacy litigation versus privacy regulation. 
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Introduction 
 
 The surge in popularity of social media, cloud computing, and mobile services has 
created an unprecedented opportunity for the collection, use and sale of personal consumer information. 
While these services clearly provide many benefits to producers and consumers, individuals suffer harm 
when their personal information is lost, stolen, or improperly accessed, causing emotional distress or 
monetary damage from fraud and identity theft.1 Since 2005, an estimated 543 million records have been 
lost from over 2,800 data breaches,2 and identity theft caused $13.3 billion in consumer financial loss in 
2010 (Bureau of Justice, 2011). In response, federal legislators have introduced numerous bills that define 
appropriate business practices regarding the collection and protection of consumer information,3 and 
federal regulators have drafted privacy frameworks for consumer data protection (Department of 
Commerce, 2010; Federal Trade Commission, 2010). For instance, the Department of Commerce 
inquired: “should baseline commercial data privacy legislation include a private right of action?” 
(Department of Commerce, 2010, 30). At issue is the degree to which federal consumer litigation deters 
privacy harms, or whether a new federal privacy statute is required. 
 
 
1 
See Solove (2007) for a description of the potential harms associated with breaches of personal information. 
2 
See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach. Last accessed Jan 22, 2012. 
3 
For example, the Cyber Security and American Cyber Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S.21), the Data Security and Breach 
Notification Act of 2011 (S.1207), the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act 2011 (S.799), the Personal Data Privacy and Security 
Act of 2011 (S.1151), the Data Breach Notification Act (S.1408), the Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 
2011 (S.1535), the Secure and Fortify Electronic Data Act of 2011 (H.R.2577), the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2011 (H.R. 
2096). 
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However, little is known about the trends in data breach litigation – which breaches are 
litigated and which are not, and with what outcomes. Current scholarship examines only a narrow 
subset of lawsuits, usually focusing on high-profile cases or those with published opinions. And so, to 
our knowledge, no empirical research involving data breach lawsuits has been conducted. The purpose 
of this manuscript is to explore two questions. First, what kinds of data breaches are being litigated in 
federal court, and why? Second, what kinds of data breach lawsuits are settling, and why? 
Overall, we believe this research can be of use to various parties. First, it can help provide 
firms with prescriptive guidance regarding the relative chances of being sued, and having to settle. This 
research could also be useful to insurance markets as a means for assessing and pricing cyber-
insurance policies. Moreover, we believe that this work can help inform both plaintiff and defense 
attorneys in better understanding overall trends of data breach litigation. Finally, we hope that our 
research can inform the policy debate and help create a balanced privacy framework protecting both 
the interests of consumers who provide personal information, and organizations that collect and 
innovate using this information. 
 
Related Work 
 
In recent years, economists have researched a number of empirical and theoretical aspects of 
data breaches, such as the effect of breaches on a firm’s stock market price (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Acquisti et al., 2006; Kannan et al., 2007; Gordon et al., 2011), the effect of 
data breach disclosure laws on identity theft (Romanosky et al., 2011), and the conditions under which 
disclosure laws may reduce the social costs of these breaches (Romanosky et al., 2010). An emerging 
body of legal scholarship also analyzes court dockets. This form of empirical research makes very 
practical use of publicly available -- and generally very detailed -- collection of pleadings, motions, 
rulings and administrative record keeping that compose a legal dispute (Kim et al., 2009; Hoffman et 
al., 2007; and Boyd and Hoffman, ND). Intuitively, economic analysis of litigation suggests that 
individuals are more likely to file suit when their expected rewards exceed their expected costs (Cooter 
& Ulen, 2008, 414-484; Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989). This hypothesis has been supported by some 
empirical work (Clermont and Eisenberg, 2002), especially in the area of financial patent litigation 
(Lerner, 2010). 
 
Data 
 
This manuscript combines a number of datasets described below. For the purpose of this 
manuscript, a data breach is defined broadly as the unauthorized disclosure of personal information by an 
organization. 
 
Data Collection 
 
To address our first research question (“Which breaches are being litigated?”), we first gathered a list of 
reported US data breaches from the Open Security Foundation (“Datalossdb”), a non-profit organization 
devoted to collecting and recording data breaches and IT vulnerabilities.
4 
Then, we used Westlaw to 
identify which of these reported breaches resulted in federal litigation. 
To address our second research question (“Which data breach lawsuits settle?”), we used 
Westlaw to perform a systematic search for all federal lawsuits in which plaintiffs alleged an unauthorized 
disclosure of their personal information. (The lawsuit observations previously used are, of course, a 
subset of the results from this search.) Specifically, we searched Westlaw’s Pleadings database using the 
following search strings: “personally identifiable information,” “personal information,” and either “data  
breach,” “security breach,” or “privacy breach.” These search terms balance specificity without biasing 
search results to specific causes or types of data breach lawsuits. We then manually examined the results  
 
 
4 
These data are used per the OSF license agreement which states: “permission is granted to use this database in 
non-profit works and research.” 
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and extracted those cases relating to unauthorized disclosure of personal information. We believe this is 
an appropriate combination of methods for identifying all lawsuits either filed in, or removed to, federal 
court and therefore represents the most complete collection of federal data breach lawsuits. 
We then used PACER to retrieve the court docket for each case. From the docket itself we coded 
the following information: presiding judge, date filed, date terminated, forum, the law firms involved in the 
suit and number of docket filings. We then purchased the complaint (or amended complaint where 
appropriate) and coded information relating to the breach such as the date of breach, size, and cause of 
the breach, types of information compromised, and all causes of action. We also identified whether any 
dispositive motions were filed, and coded the disposition of the case. Settlement information (such as 
actual confirmation of a settlement, and amounts of any damage awards) was obtained either from the 
docket filings, or from directly contacting the litigating attorneys. 
 
Data Generating Process 
 
Data breach and lawsuit data are generated from the processes shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Data generating process. 
 
Stage 1: Reported and unreported breaches. As mentioned, for the purpose of this manuscript, a 
“data breach” is defined as the unauthorized disclosure of personal information. From this population of 
events only a subset will become public knowledge and “reported” by the Datalossdb clearinghouse. 
Specifically, the only breaches that are included in this clearinghouse are those relating to social security 
numbers, financial/banking information, credit card numbers, or medical information, and where the 
number of records compromised exceeds 10.
5 
This group has been systematically collecting data breach 
information since 2005.
6
 
Stage 2: Non-litigated, state-litigated, and federally-litigated data breaches. Stage 2 describes 
three separate outcomes from the sample of reported breaches: non-litigated, federally-litigated, or state- 
litigated.
7 
Because our key research questions relate to federal policy solutions to resolving the 
externalities caused by data breaches, our empirical focus compares federally-litigated breaches with non-
federally-litigated breaches (i.e. both state- and non-litigated breaches). It is important to note that by  
 
 
5 
Note that the sample of “unreported breaches” (the dotted line from Stage 1 to Stage 2) also contains observations which would 
be non-litigated, federally-litigated, or state-litigated. However, when addressing our first research question (“Which data breaches 
are litigated?”), we do not include these observations. 
6 
See http://datalossdb.org/about, last accessed Jan 25, 2012. 
7 
Arbitration is one further category of outcome that may exist. In these cases, plaintiffs, as a result of enjoying a firm’s good or 
service, are contractually bound to resolve any legal dispute through arbitration, rather than civil court. However, we are unaware of 
any arbitrations in which privacy rights have been adjudicated. 
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pooling state- and non-litigated breaches we are still able to obtain unbiased estimates of federal lawsuits 
resulting from reported data breaches.
8
 
Stage 3: Federal lawsuits observed from Westlaw. For Stage 3, we obtained a sample of federal 
lawsuits through Westlaw using a systematic search strategy designed to identify the largest collection of 
data breach lawsuits practical, and then manually edited the list of suits matching our research question. 
Investigations by researchers have concluded that the Westlaw Pleadings database (used in this 
analysis), “covers or nearly covers the universe of federal claims [as it related to veil piercing lawsuits]” 
and that it “was designed to collect all federal complaints since 2000 that lawyers litigating commercial 
cases would have a plausible interest in learning about.” (Boyd and Hoffman, ND). Therefore, we do not 
believe that the use of Westlaw would pose any significant selection bias for our analysis. 
 It is relevant to also mention that the sample of unreported breaches may result in no federal or 
state litigation, although - for clarity - only the path to federally-litigated breaches is drawn in Figure 1 
(these data are included for the purpose of our second research question: “Which data breach lawsuits 
settle?”). 
 
Which Data Breaches are Litigated in Federal Court? 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) examine prior theoretical models of litigation to create a unified 
framework for legal disputes. They present an analytical foundation describing the tensions faced by 
injurer and victim (defendant and plaintiff) at each stage of a dispute. First, when deciding whether or not 
to prevent an accident, an injurer balances the (marginal) cost of care with the (marginal) cost of an 
accident. Then, when deciding whether or not to sue, a plaintiff compares the cost of litigation with the 
expected benefit from an award. Finally, when deciding whether to settle or proceed to trial, both plaintiff 
and defendant balance their expected costs of litigation with the outcome from trial. This section is 
concerned with the second stage (the alleged victim’s decision to file suit), which is increasing in both the 
probability of success and magnitude of award (her expected gain). Below, we adapt these conditions to 
data breach litigation to construct appropriate hypotheses. 
First, we consider the magnitude of a potential award. Given that most data breach lawsuits are 
class actions, the magnitude of a plaintiff’s award becomes a function of the size of the class, which is 
proportional by the number of records compromised in the data breach. If it is true that class action 
lawsuits are, in general, driven by class action plaintiffs' attorneys, it follows that the larger the data 
breach, the greater the potential fee award to the attorney, and the greater the incentive to bring and 
litigate the suit. 
9 
Therefore, the probability of a lawsuit is positively correlated with the number of records 
lost (H1a). 
Next, the probability of a favorable outcome is multifaceted. Among other things, it is a function of 
whether an alleged harm can be attributed directly to the breach, the cause of the breach, and the types 
of information lost. 
 Plaintiffs in many data breach lawsuits seek relief for harms such as actual financial loss from 
identity theft, emotional distress, costs of credit monitoring, and anticipated future losses. However, a 
critical factor affecting the success of a lawsuit is the presence of a cognizable harm for which the law 
could provide a remedy. In the context of data breach litigation, this is manifested by whether or not the 
plaintiff can allege (though would not yet have to prove) financial harm. Moreover, plaintiff harm (loss) is 
also a function of whether the breached firm provided any initial compensation immediately following the 
breach and before litigation. This redress is commonly offered in the form of credit monitoring or identity 
theft insurance. Full compensation for any loss will decrease plaintiffs' legal remedies. Therefore, the  
 
 
8 
Alternatively, had we complete data on all three outcomes, one might choose to estimate a multinomial logit model in order to 
separately estimate marginal effects on federal- versus state-litigated breaches. Or, one might pool state and federal suits together 
in order to draw inferences about all litigated breaches. However, because our topic of interest is primarily federal policy matters, we 
pool all non-federally litigated outcomes (that is, state and non-litigated breaches). 
9 
It is not the purpose of this research to address the motivations of attorneys, but merely to understand and apply relevant behavior 
in forming reasonable hypotheses. Conversations with class action plaintiffs attorneys confirm that while it is true that attorneys do 
seek plaintiffs, plaintiffs also seek attorneys for class action litigation. 
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probability of a lawsuit is positively correlated with the presence of actual harm, and negatively correlated 
with credit monitoring (H1b). 
The legal merits matter. In the context of data breaches, a plaintiff’s case is strengthened by her 
ability to prove that the defendant had a legal duty to protect their personal information, and somehow 
failed in that duty. This could occur in two different ways. 
The first manner relates to the cause of the breach, which typically occurs in one of three ways: 
improper disclosure or disposal of personal information (e.g. tossing tax records in a dumpster); a 
computer hack (e.g. computer-based theft of information); loss or theft of hardware (e.g. petty theft of 
computer hardware that happens to contain personal information). Of these methods, we consider that the 
first cause (the careless handling of personal information) may provide the strongest legal argument, 
because it involves the negligent behavior on the part of the data custodian, as opposed to the misfortune 
of petty theft. Therefore, lawsuits are more likely to occur from breaches caused by improper disclosure of 
information, relative to the computer hack, or loss of hardware (H1c). 
 The second manner relates to the types of information compromised. It is reasonable to consider 
that the greater the legal duty to protect certain information (typically enforced through statute), the greater 
the probability of a favorable outcome. For instance, organizations using medical and financial data are 
governed by a regulatory environment requiring the enhanced protection of such data. The Health 
Information Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA) requires patient consent before the disclosure of 
medical information between health agencies. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) require greater security controls protecting an individual’s credit data. In addition, 
many state and federal laws require the proper disposal of social security numbers (Dickey et al., 2011) 
and the storage and transmission of credit card data is also protected through contractual agreements by 
the credit card companies under the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS). 
Therefore, the probability of a lawsuit is positively correlated with the compromise of personal information 
requiring a heightened level of protection, such as social security numbers, financial, credit card and 
medical data (H1d). 
10
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our final sample of Datalossdb data consists of 1,772 US data breach observations, of which only 
65 (3.7%) were litigated in federal court. Figure 2 compares the number of reported data breaches with 
the number of federally-litigated breaches during the period 2005 to 2010. In the left panel, lawsuits are 
scaled according to the left axis (0-16), while reported breaches are scaled according to the right axis (0- 
600). The right panel shows the ratio of filed lawsuits to the number of breaches reported in that year (i.e., 
the portion of federally-litigated breaches over time). The right panel shows that, in 2005, the proportion 
of federal lawsuits was about 10%. However, since 2005, the proportion of federal lawsuits appears to be 
declining slightly, reaching around 3% in 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Reported breaches vs. known lawsuits. 
 
 
 
10 
Note that we employ the general categories used in the Dataloss clearinghouse and that these categories are not mutually 
exclusive: a data breach can compromise one or more types of data. 
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Figure 3 compares breaches that were and were not federally-litigated as a function of the types 
of personal information compromised. Note that a single breach may result in the compromise of multiple 
types of personal information. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Types of personal information compromised. 
 
Breaches involving financial data (FIN) and credit card numbers (CCN) are more likely to be 
litigated in federal court, which provides some support for H1c. Social security numbers (SSN), on the 
other hand, compromised about 78% of non-litigated breaches, though only 58% of litigated breaches. 
Medical data (MED) appear to be equally represented in federally-litigated and non-federally-litigated 
breaches. 
 
Estimating Model 
 
To test hypotheses H1a-H1d, we estimate a binary outcome model predicting the probability that 
a reported data breach will result in a federal lawsuit,
11
 
 
 
 
where lawsuit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a reported breach, i, results in a federal lawsuit, 
and 0 otherwise.
12 
Although we cannot determine with absolute certainty whether financial loss had 
occurred following a data breach, we can proxy for this by observing any evidence from news reports 
following the breach. Therefore, ActualHarm is coded as 1 if we observe any evidence of financial loss 
due to the breach, and 0 otherwise.
13 
CreditMonitoring is a dummy variable coded as 1 if there was any 
evidence that the breached firm provided any sort of credit monitoring or identity theft insurance to the 
individuals following the breach.
14 
Cause is a vector of mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive 
dummies reflecting the cause of the data breach: improper disclosure or disposal, computer hack or  
 
 
11 
Eq. 1 is shown as a linear probability model for clarity only. Actual regressions are estimated using logit. Also note that we limit 
inferences to predictions of the probability of a known federal lawsuit conditional on a reported data breach. 
12 
Note again that this coding inherently pools state-litigated and non-litigated breaches, thereby ensuring that estimates of federal 
lawsuits from reported breaches are unbiased. 
13 
Of the 1772 data breaches, we were unable to find news reports for 83 of them. In the absence of evidence, we 
took the most conservative approach and coded these breaches as not causing actual harm. We then performed a robustness 
check by considering that all 83 observations did cause actual harm. All estimates maintain qualitative 
magnitude and significance except for ActualHarm which reduces in magnitude by one third and therefore loses statistical 
significance. One may also be concerned that plaintiffs may wait many years following a breach before 
filing suit, however we do not find evidence of this. In a sample of 146 single-suit breaches, 78% were filed within one year, and 
87% were filed within two years of public notification. 
14 
This information was obtained from breach disclosure notices obtained by the Datalossdb clearinghouse, or through news 
reports, when available. Given that perfect information is not always available, we code this variable equal to 1 only when there is 
actual evidence of redress. As a result, this variable is likely an under-estimate of the true frequency. 
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lost/stolen hardware.
15 
ProtectedPII is a vector of dummies representing types of personally identifiable 
information (PII) should require a heightened level of protection, as described in the hypothesis: social 
security number, medical, financial, credit card). Controls represents a vector of controls for all other data 
types (email address, name/address, etc), industry of the breached firm, whether the firm was a non-profit 
or publicly traded, and year dummies (2005 to 2010). εi is the random error term, assumed to be 
independent of the observed covariates. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in Eq. 1 are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Results 
 
The results of Eq. 1 are presented in Table 1 and reflect the average marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of lawsuit estimated using a logit regression.
16 
Model 1 presents 
just the variables of interest from H1a-H1d and includes only Year controls, whereas Model 2 includes all 
data types. Models 3a and 3b control for industry variables; they are based on the same estimating 
equation, but Model 3b presents the results as odds ratios. 
The results are robust across all models, with the third model – which controls for all variables - 
providing the better fit for the data and generally more conservative estimates. Though not shown, results 
are also robust to the exclusion of individual years 2005-2010, and to probit models. Further discussions 
therefore focus on results from Model 3a. 
In regard to the effect of the size of the breach on probability of lawsuit, our results suggest that a 
10-fold increase in the number of compromised records increases the average probability of lawsuit by 
8% ( from 3.7% to 11.7%), a statistically significant amount (at the 1% level), which supports H1a.
17
 
Supporting H1b, the presence of actual (financial) loss is associated with a 2.5% increase in the 
probability of litigation (though, only significant at the 10% level), while the presence of credit monitoring is 
associated with a 3.7% decrease in probability of litigation (significant at the 1% level). Described in terms 
of odds-ratios (Model 3b), these results suggest that the odds of a firm being sued are 3.5 times greater 
when individuals suffer actual (financial) harm, but 6 times lower (1/0.152) when they provide free credit 
monitoring following a breach. While credit monitoring is widely touted by as a best practice following a 
data breach and, indeed, is included as part of a recent federal data security bill (HR2221), we provide the 
first statistical evidence to substantiate the practice's value in reducing an organization’s ex post liability 
costs. 
Next, we examine the relative odds of a lawsuit occurring given the different cause of the data 
breach (unauthorized disclosure, hack, or lost/stolen). Our results suggest that the odds of a firm being 
sued due to the unauthorized disclosure/disposal of consumer information are 3 times greater, relative to 
breaches caused by lost/stolen data (significant at the 5% level), supporting H1c. These results suggest 
that individuals are much more likely to punish firms when the firm is thought to have behaved negligently 
with consumer information, relative to the firm being the unfortunate victim of computer hardware theft. 
Among all types of personally identifiable information (PII) requiring greater protection, we find 
that only the compromise of financial data is significantly correlated with the probability of lawsuit: the 
compromise of financial data increased the probability of lawsuit 5.1% (significant at the 1% level), which 
provides only partial support for H1d. That is, the odds of a firm being sued are 6 times greater when the 
breach involved the loss of financial information. 
 
 
 
15 
As is customary with categorical variables, we will omit one of these from the regression analysis. Given that the selection is 
arbitrary, we omit “lost/stolen.” 
16 
Note that the marginal effects for logit models are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates, and so the effect of a regressor 
on the probability of lawsuit can either be presented as the effect for the “average observation” (i.e. marginal effect computed at the 
sample mean of the regressors) or, the “average effect” (i.e. computing the marginal effect for all observations and taking the 
average). We believe the second approach is more appropriate for our model because: 1) we avoid the confusion of subjectively 
determining the value of the regressor at which to compute the marginal effect, as in the case of the logged regressor, and 2) given 
that most explanatory variables are dummies, we do not need to justify having to calculate the marginal effect at a sample mean of 
a binary regressor. 
17 
A 10 fold increase represents a change of 900%, or 0.009*9 = 0.081 or 8.1%. 
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Table 1 
Regression results Eq. (1) 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, we find that our hypotheses support theoretical models of litigation. In this arena, 
dominated by class-action practice, parties appear to behave in a rational and wealth-maximizing manner. 
In the context of data breaches, this translates to a higher probability of a federal lawsuit given evidence of 
actual financial loss, stronger claims of negligence (unauthorized disposal of information), and heightened 
protection of personal financial information. However, notwithstanding the statistically significant results, 
none were large in magnitude. That is, no marginal effect was larger than 5%. It is yet unclear whether the 
magnitude of these findings is, in itself, unexpected, though it does warrant further consideration. 
Next, we examine the characteristics of data breach lawsuits leading to settlement. 
 
Which Data Breach Lawsuits Settle? 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The previous section leveraged the theoretical analysis of dispute litigation to develop hypotheses 
explaining the probability of a federal data breach lawsuit. We continue that process to develop  
hypotheses regarding the probability of settlement once a suit has been filed. 
Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) consider that a plaintiff (and her attorney) will decide to settle when 
the expected gains from settlement exceed the expected gains from trial. However, the vast majority of 
data breach lawsuits terminate before trial, either through dismissal or by settlement. Indeed, of over 230 
suits in our dataset, we observe only two instances of a plaintiff prevailing on a favorable ruling by a judge 
or jury. Therefore, we can simplify the theoretical model by stating that a plaintiff (and her attorney) will 
settle when the expected benefits from a settlement award exceed the cost of further litigation. We now 
adapt this theory to data breach litigation by examining conditions that would increase either the 
probability or magnitude of settlement. 
iConference 2013  February 12-15, 2013 Fort Worth, TX, USA 
 
 
 
132 
The recognition of the legal merits or “case strength” of a lawsuit has been the topic of much 
analysis in legal scholarship (see, generally, Boyd and Hoffman, ND, and Eisenberg and Lanvers, 2009; 
and see Johnson et al., 2007, Cox et al., 2008, and Choi, 2007, in regard to securities class action 
litigation). Data breach lawsuits are often dismissed because of lack of identity theft following the breach 
(GAO, 2007). However, there are cases when plaintiffs do suffer actual harm and are therefore able to 
overcome this procedural obstacle and obtain settlement. Hence, we consider that in the context of data 
breach lawsuits the presence of “actual harm” represents an appropriate measure of a meritorious legal 
claim that should affect the probability of settlement. Therefore, the probability of settlement is positively 
correlated with lawsuits in which the plaintiff is able to demonstrate actual harm (H2a). 
A second factor which may affect the magnitude of the settlement award is whether, in class 
action lawsuits, the class achieves certification. Class certification represents the difference between 
damages potentially awarded to only a few named plaintiffs, versus thousands or millions of plaintiffs. 
Indeed, “class certification stands not as a mere judicial byway on the road toward full-fledged trial on the 
merits but, almost invariably, as the last significant judicial checkpoint on the road toward settlement” 
(Nagareda, 2010, p152). Therefore, the probability of settlement is positively correlated with achieving 
class certification (H2b). 
A final driver potentially affecting the magnitude of settlement is statutory damages. Plaintiffs bring 
many kinds of common law claims (e.g. negligence, breach of contract) and statutory causes of action. For 
example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act. A defining characteristic of these Acts is their mere violation can justify 
plaintiff relief through statutory damages. For example, the Wiretap Act allows recovery up to $100 per 
day or $1000, whichever is greater; the CFAA allows statutory damages of $5000 per incident (record 
compromised). Hence, we consider that defendants may be more likely to settle when complaints include 
causes of action with statutory damages. The reasons are twofold. First, these allegations shift the 
burden from the plaintiff having to demonstrate harm to the defendant having to prove that they did not 
violate the law, increasing the defendant’s cost of litigation. Indeed, “the only real significant liability threat 
to those companies sustaining a data breach is the advent of statutory damages – damages that would 
ensue with or without any showing of real harm to a plaintiff” (Paray, 2011). Second, there may be a 
saliency effect when the defendant is forced to consider the potentially massive damage award that is the 
product of the statutory damages and the size of the class. Therefore, the probability of settlement is 
positively correlated with lawsuits in which the plaintiff seeks statutory damages (H2c). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
To address our second research question, we relax the restrictions imposed in Section 4 and 
employ our full set of federal data breach lawsuits. Note that this dataset is more comprehensive than that 
used in Section 4, in that it includes all federally-litigated breaches (though we omit pending and public 
action suits). The resulting dataset of 164 observations consists of lawsuits that terminated either by 
settlement (n=86) or dismissal (n=78). 
Figure 4 examines the proportion of cases in which plaintiffs were able to show actual damage 
(H2a), where the case achieved class certification (H2b), and where the plaintiff sought statutory damages 
(H2c). Note that in the following figures, percentages sum to 100% in each adjacent column pair. 
The top two pair-wise comparisons illustrate a similar result: the majority of cases that allege 
actual harm or achieved class certification, settled. That is, of the cases that alleged actual harm (n=28), 
71% of them settled, whereas only 49% of them without actual harm (n=135) settled. Similarly, of the 
cases that achieved class certification, 85% settled, whereas when the class was not certified, only 48% 
settled. The bottom panel, on the other hand, is more balanced. Of the cases that include causes of 
action with statutory damages, 59% settled, and only about 45% otherwise. Again, note that these figures 
reflect data from all years, and that the patterns presented in both panels are robust across individual 
years. 
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Figure 4. Pair-wise comparisons by settlement. 
 
Estimating Model 
 
We again employ a discrete outcome model to estimate the probability of settlement, 
 
             settlementi = α0 + ActualHarmi + ClassCertifiedi + StatutoryDamagesi + Controlsi  + εi       (2) 
 
where settlement is a binary outcome variable coded as 1 if the lawsuit terminated in settlement and 0 
otherwise. ActualHarm is coded as 1 if the plaintiff’s complaint alleges an actual loss due to the breach 
(for instance, if the plaintiff alleges fraudulent charges on a credit card, stolen money from a checking or 
savings account, or other such costs incurred from criminal activity). ClassCertified is coded as 1 of the 
suit achieved class certification. StatutoryDamages is coded as 1 if the complaint alleged violation of a 
federal statute allowing for statutory damages. Controls is a vector of explanatory variables that includes 
size and cause of the breach, types of information lost, industry and circuit court controls, number of 
causes of action and number of times the complaint was amended, and year when the case was 
disposed. εi is the random error term, assumed to be independent of observed covariates. Descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in Eq. 2 are shown in Table 3. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of Eq. 2, reporting the average marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of settlement. Model 1 includes just the variables of interest and year fixed 
effects, while Model 2 includes subsequent controls for Breach and Industry characteristics. Model 3a and 
3b include the full set of controls and estimate the same equation, with Model 3b presenting the results as 
odds-ratios. Further discussions therefore focus on estimations from Model 3a. 
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Table 2 
Regression results Eq. (2) 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results suggest that, after controlling for all variables, plaintiff allegations of financial harm 
are correlated with a 30% increase in the probability of settlement (from 52% to 68%, significant at the 1% 
level), supporting H2a. Similarly, the certification of a class action, as Nagareda (2010) theorizes, 
increases the probability of settlement by 30% (significant at the 1% level), supporting H2b. In addition to 
each being highly statistically significant, these estimates are also large in magnitude and therefore of 
strong practical significance. 
On the other hand, we find that causes of action asserting a violation of a federal statute with 
statutory damages were not positively correlated with settlement, lending no support for H2c. This finding 
is somewhat surprising given that this hypothesis had a strong theoretical and practical justification: these 
claims can help shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff in having to demonstrate actual harm to the 
defendant in having to prove it did not violate the law. A possible explanation for this result could be that 
the novelty of federal-statute based privacy litigation made it harder for the parties to arrive upon a shared 
understanding of the merits. 
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Interestingly, while the compromise of financial data and breaches caused by improper 
disposal/disclosure appeared to drive litigation, the compromise of medical data and breaches caused by 
cyber attack appear to drive settlement. Moreover, even without actual harm or class certification, 
lawsuits still tend to settle about half of the time. That is, cases with merit were much more likely to settle - 
yet, cases without merit still settle about half of the time. 
A possible explanation could be that defendants choose to settle for reasons entirely unrelated to 
the merits of a case. For example, they may be rationally choosing to settle to avoid further litigation costs, 
publicity, or distraction. Specifically, defendants may be balancing between the costs of an immediate and 
“certain” settlement, versus a future “uncertain” amount (that includes a settlement award with some 
probability in addition to legal fees). Nevertheless, a full explanation, we believe, warrants 
more consideration. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Recent events concerning breaches of consumer personal information have prompted a flurry of 
lawsuits by alleged victims of identity theft. These disputes have generated considerable Congressional 
activity concerning the collection, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable consumer health, 
financial and behavioral information. But is litigation an effective solution? 
Consider both the probability of data breach litigation and settlement. On one hand, the overall 
federal litigation rate for reported data breaches is only about 4%, which may provide comfort to firms 
(potential defendants) that collect personal information. On the other hand, the settlement rate for all 
known federally litigated breaches is much higher than one might expect (50%), which would alternatively 
be encouraging to plaintiffs. Moreover, if actual harm (as defined within this manuscript) is indeed an 
appropriate measure of case merit, then the results presented here may provide some assurance that 
data breach lawsuits are being appropriately disposed of, on average. That is, those cases that should 
settle (because of the presence of actual harm), do settle. In fact, the top left panel of Figure 4 suggests 
that defendants settle perhaps too often (i.e. in absence of actual financial harm, and therefore case 
merit). 
 
References 
 
Acquisti, A., Friedman, A. and Telang, R. 2006. Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study. 
Fifth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security. Jun. 26. 
Boyd, C., & Hoffman, D. ND. Litigating Toward Settlement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 
Forthcoming. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011. Identity Theft Reported by Households, 2005-2010. U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Campbell, K., Gordon, L., Loeb, L., and Zhou, L. 2003. The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced 
Information Security Breaches: Empirical Evidence from the stock market. Journal of Computer 
Security, 11(3) 431-448. 
Cavusoglu, H., Mishra, B., and Raghunathan, S. 2004. The Effect of Internet Security Breach 
Announcements on Market Value: Capital Market Reactions for Breached Firms and Internet 
Security Developers. International J. of Electronic Commerce 9(1). 
Clermont, K. and Eisenberg, T. 2002. Litigation Realities. 88 Cornell Law Review, 119-154. 
Choi, S. 2007. Do the Merits Matter Less after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization, 23(3), 598-626. 
Cooter, R., and Ulen, T. 2008. Law & Economics. Pearson Education, Inc, 5th ed. 
Cooter, R. and Rubinfeld, D. 1989. Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 27(3). 
Cox, J., Thomas, R. and Bai, L. 2008. There are Plaintiffs and... There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis 
of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 Vanderbilt Law Review, 355. 
Department of Commerce, 2010. Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: A 
Dynamic Policy Framework, US Department of Commerce. 
iConference 2013  February 12-15, 2013 Fort Worth, TX, USA 
 
 
 
136 
Dickey, T., Ganz, D. and Lever, J. 2011. Privacy Protection and Data Breaches: HR Tip of the Month, The 
Blog of the National Law Review. Available at http://nationallawforum.com/2011/04/24/privacy-
protection-and-data-breaches-hr-tip-of-the-month/. Last accessed July 24, 2011. April 24. 
Eisenberg, T., and Lanvers, C. 2009. What is The Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care? Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, 6(1), 111-146. 
Federal Trade Commission. 2010. Protecting consumer privacy in an era of rapid change. Federal Trade 
Commission. 
Government Accountability Office. 2007. Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity 
Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown. GAO publication GAO-07-737. 
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M., and Zhou, L. 2011. The Impact of Information Security Breaches: Has There Been 
a Downward Shift in Costs? Journal of Computer Security. 
Hoffman, D., Izenman, A., and Lidicker, J. R. 2007. Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 681. 
Johnson, M., Nelson, K. and Prichard., A. 2007. Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 23 (3), 627-652. 
Kannan, K., Rees, J. and Sridhar, S. 2007. Market Reactions To Information Security Breach 
Announcements. International Journal of Electronic Commerce 12(1) 69-91. 
Kim, P., Schlanger, M., Boyd, C., and Martin, A. 2009. How Should We Study District Judge Decision- 
Making? Journal of Law and Policy, 29(83). 
Lerner, J. 2010. The Litigation of Financial Innovations. Journal of Law and Economics, 53(4), 807-831. 
Nagareda, R. A., 2010 Common Answers for Class Certification. Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc, 63, 
149-170. 
Paray, P. 2011. The Elephant in the Room: The Potential for Privacy Breach Statutory Damages. Digital 
Risk Strategies. February 18. 
Romanosky, S., Sharp, R., and Acquisti, A. 2010. Data breaches and Identity Theft: When is Mandatory 
Disclosure Optimal? Paper presented at the Ninth Workshop on the Economics of Information 
Security (WEIS 2010), Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Romanosky, S., Telang, R., and Acquisti, A. 2011. Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity 
Theft? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 30(2), 256-286. 
 
iConference 2013  February 12-15, 2013 Fort Worth, TX, USA 
 
 
 
137 
Appendix 
 
Table 1. 
Summary Statistics for Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). 
 
 
 
 
